Assertion:

Pat Hayes:
Here is Hobb's idea, in his own words:

> > p(x) says that p is
> >true of x.  p'(e,x) says that e is the situation or eventuality of p
> >being true of x.  The relation between p and p' is given by the axiom
> >schema
> >
> >    (A x)[p(x) <--> (E e)[p'(e,x) & Rexists(e)]]
> >
> >I.e., p is true of x iff there is an eventuality e that is p's being
> >true of x and e exists in the real world.

The use of the 'prime' on p here is a notational trick to associate 
the eventuality-relation with the original predication. But 
notational quibbles aside, Hobbs' ontological idea is that there is a 
real entity corresponding to every assertable proposition. Its not 
the same as the proposition (it's not true or false, for example) but 
it does exist; in fact, his worlds are *made* of these things, like a 
kind of tangle of propositional taffeta.  They don't have what we 
would call physical objects in them at all, only eventualities of the 
existence of physical objects; the objects themselves are more like 
platonic ideals.